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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Plaintiff incorrectly states the issues for review in his Appellate Brief. 
Therefore, Defendants' statement will include a recap of the issues stated 
by Plaintiff, followed by a correct statement of the issues. 
Plaintiffs Statement of the First Issue: "The 180-day statute of 
limitations at UCA Sec. 67-21-4(2) (2004) is superceded by Notice of Claim 
provisions at UCA Sees. 63-30d-402 and 403 (2004) under Hall v. 
Department of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, 24 P.3d 958." (PL's App. Br., p. 1). 
Plaintiffs Statement of the Second Issue: "Summary judgment was 
not appropriate because the facts 1-16 in the defendants' statement of facts 
that are deemed admitted by rule CJA 4-501 [now URCP 7] did not settle 
the question and require the court to engage in further impermissible fact-
finding and to apply an incorrect legal standard." (PL's App. Br., p. 1). 
Pursuant to the procedural history of this case, as well as Plaintiffs 
Notice of Appeal, Plaintiffs statement of issues is incorrect. Defendants 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum, to 
which Plaintiff replied with a Motion to Strike. (R. 87; R. 127; and, R. 131 
-1-
respectively). The Trial Court granted Defendants' Motion and denied 
Plaintiffs. (R. 166). 
Prior to entry of the relevant Order, Plaintiff filed a Motion for New 
Trial, claiming the Trial Court erroneously granted Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and denied Plaintiff's Motion to Strike. (R. 168; 
Supporting Mem. at R. 173). The Trial Court denied the Motion for New 
Trial and Plaintiff appeals that denial, as well as the prior rulings 
underlying the Motion. (Rul. on Mot. for New Tr., R. 206; Or., R. 213; Not. 
ofApp., R. 214). 
The 180-day statute of limitations to which Plaintiff refers in his 
Statement of the First Issue for Review is the basis upon which the Trial 
Court granted Summary Judgment dismissing only Plaintiffs First Cause 
of Action. (R. 161). The statute of limitations argument cannot constitute 
an issue for review in and of itself, separate from the granting of summary 
judgment on all causes of action. Accordingly, the appropriate issues for 
review are as follows: 
ISSUE ONE: Did the Trial Court correctly deny Plaintiffs Motion for 
a New Trial, based on its determination that no error of law existed to 
support Plaintiffs Motion? 
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Standard of Review: In reviewing a Trial Court's denial of a 
motion for new trial, Appellate Courts will reverse the Trial Court only for 
abuse of discretion after looking at the background of the situation 
underlying the denial. Smithv. Shreeve, 551 P.2d 1261, 1262 (Utah 1976). 
ISSUE TWO: Did the Trial Court correctly deny Plaintiff's Motion to 
Strike Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting 
Memorandum, based on Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration and U.R.C.P. 56? 
Standard of Review: Because the Trial Court denied Plaintiffs 
Motion to Strike based on application of legal rules and standards, this 
issue presents a question of law that the Appellate Court reviews under a 
correction of error standard. In the Matter of Baby Boy Doe, 894 P.2d 1285, 
1287 (Utah App. 1995). 
ISSUE THREE: Did the Trial Court correctly grant Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, based on the uncontroverted facts 
presented in Defendants' Supporting Memorandum? 
Standard of Review: In considering a grant of summary 
judgment, Appellate Courts review the Trial Court's legal determinations for 
correctness, giving no deference, and reviewing the facts in the light most 
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favorable to the nonmoving party. Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 48 P.3d 941, 
944 (Utah 2002). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
Because the Rules of Appellate Procedure require both appellants and 
appellees to include a section in their briefs stating how the issues were 
preserved, it is necessary for Defendants to argue under this section that 
the issues were not preserved. (Utah R. App. P. 24(b)(2004)). Accordingly, 
Defendants make those arguments here rather than including them in the 
argument section of their brief. 
Plaintiff Failed to Preserve Issues One and Two 
Regarding the Court's Denial of His Motion for 
New Trial and Denial of His Motion to Strike 
Despite Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal stating that Plaintiff was appealing 
from the Trial Court's denial of his Motion for New Trial and the Court's 
decisions on the underlying Motions, Plaintiff failed to preserve those issues 
because he did not comply with the briefing requirements set forth in Rule 
24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Regarding preservation of the 
issues, U.R.A.P. states: 
[The appellate brief must contain] citation to the 
record showing that the issue was preserved in the 
trial court; or 
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A statement of grounds for seeking review of an 
issue not preserved in the trial court. 
U.R.A.P. 24(a)(5)(A) and (a)(5)(B). 
In State v. Lucero, 47 P.3d 107 (Utah App. 2002) this Court addressed 
whether certain issues were properly preserved. The Court declined to 
reach the issues raised for appeal because the appellant failed to 
adequately brief those issues. Id. at 109-10. Specifically, the appellant 
failed to cite where the issues for appeal were preserved in the record and 
to set forth the applicable standard of review. The appellant's brief also 
failed to cite adequate legal authority or sufficiently argue the allegations he 
raised. Id. See also, U.R.A.P. 24(a)(9) (requiring citations and legal 
authority to support arguments). 
Likewise, Plaintiffs Appellate Brief in this case fails to even identify 
the Motion for New Trial and/or Motion to Strike as issues, let alone to 
address the standard of review or include citations to the record where the 
issues were preserved. Nor does Plaintiffs brief contain adequate citations 
and legal authority supporting his arguments. For example, Plaintiff argues 
that the Trial Court improperly refused to consider certain documents upon 
which Plaintiff sought to rely below, citing the Court's Ruling on Plaintiffs 
Motion for New Trial. However, Plaintiff provides no supporting authority 
as to why the Court's refusal to consider those documents was erroneous, 
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such that would warrant reversal of the Court's denial of Plaintiffs Motion 
for New Trial based on the applicable standard of review. (PL's Brief, pp. 
10-11, citing R. 204). 
Moreover, Plaintiffs brief refers to his Motion to Strike and the Trial 
Court's ruling thereon at various times throughout pages 1-11 of his brief. 
(PL's Br, pp. 1-11). Again however, Plaintiff fails to cite any supporting 
authority stating why the Trial Court erred in its ruling and why this Court 
should reverse the ruling based on the applicable standard of review. 
Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to preserve the first two issues for appeal and 
the Court should decline to reach those issues. 
Plaintiff Failed to Preserve Issue Three for 
Appeal Regarding the Trial Court's Grant of 
Summary Judgment for Defendants 
The issue of whether the Trial Court erred in granting Summary 
Judgment was not preserved for appeal because Plaintiff did not properly 
oppose Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff instead chose 
to rely upon a Motion to Strike that did not identify any disputed facts. (R. 
168). Plaintiff also filed a Rule 56(f) request for an extension of time to file 
an opposition. (R. 129). The Trial Court did not rule on the Rule 56(f) 
request, but Defendants' counsel voluntarily granted an extension of time 
for Plaintiff to oppose the Motion. (Letter from Michael F. Skolnick to 
-6-
Robert Copier, Sept. 19, 2003, R. 135). Plaintiff still failed to timely oppose 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
It is well established in Utah that an appellate court will not consider 
an issue raised for the first time on appeal. See, ONGInternational (U.S.A.), 
Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993). Thus the Court 
should decline to review the issue of whether the Trial Court erred in 
granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. See also, Clegg 
v. Lee, 516 P.2d 348, 353 (Utah 1973) (refusing to consider argument for 
first time on appeal where appellants offered no affidavits opposing 
summary judgment that set forth facts supporting their claim). 
Oral argument was held on Plaintiffs Motion to Strike and 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on February 26, 2004. 
Plaintiffs counsel argued at the hearing, for the first time, that disputed 
issues of fact existed which precluded Summary Judgment. The Trial Court 
ruled that Defendants' statement of facts was deemed admitted, based on 
Plaintiffs failure to oppose those facts in writing as required by Rule 56(e) 
and Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. (R. 166 - R. 
162). The attempts of Plaintiffs counsel to dispute the facts for the first 
time at the motion hearing does not constitute raising such arguments 
below for purposes of appellate review. See, Shire Development v. Frontier 
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Investments, 799 P.2d 221 (Utah App. 1990). In Shire, this Court refused 
to consider, inter alia, an argument the appellant raised on appeal, holding 
that because the appellant only raised the argument briefly during oral 
argument on summary judgment, the argument was not sufficiently 
preserved for appeal. Id. at 224. 
Moreover, in Mills v. Brody, 929 P.2d 360, 364 (Utah App. 1996) this 
Court refused to consider a claimant's estoppel argument on appeal since 
the claimant had not properly preserved that argument, despite the fact she 
had mentioned it in her answer and referenced it in oral argument during 
the hearing on the opposing party's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 
364. Specifically, this Court stated: 
Although [appellant] mentioned estoppel in her 
answer and made some references to the issue in a 
hearing before the trial court, these nominal 
references did not sufficiently raise the issue to a 
level of consciousness before the trial court. 
Id. Therefore, Plaintiffs presentation of substantive arguments in 
opposition to Summary Judgment for the first time at oral argument did not 
preserve these arguments for appeal. 
Despite his failure to oppose Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, following issuance of the Court's Memorandum Ruling denying 
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike and granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
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Judgment, Plaintiff filed a Motion for New Trial and Supporting 
Memorandum, citing to the Trial Court's alleged dilatory conduct in 
handling the Motion to Strike. (R. 168; R. 173). Plaintiff then filed a 
"Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial/Denial of 
Summary Judgment" ("Supplemental Memorandum") arguing for the first 
time that the Trial Court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs First Cause of Action 
based on the statute of limitations. (R. 192 - R. 194). The Trial Court 
refused to consider the arguments because Plaintiff failed to seek leave of 
court to file a supplemental memorandum as required by U.R.C.P. 7(c)(1). 
(R. 204). 
Regarding the remaining causes of action: intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, constructive termination, defamation and punitive 
damages, Plaintiff presents in his Appellate Brief, for the first time, 
substantive arguments against dismissal of those claims. (PL's App. Br., 
passim). Plaintiff cannot oppose Summary Judgment on substantive 
grounds for the first time on appeal when he did not do so in opposition to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Utah Rules of Jud. Adm. 4-501 (2003), MOTIONS: Reproduced 
in the Addendum hereto. 
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2. Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-2. et seq. (2003). UTAH PROTECTION 
OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ACT (the "Whistle Blower Act"): Reproduced in the 
Addendum hereto. 
3. Utah Code Ann. 8 63-30d-402 (2003) [63-30-13 at the relevant 
time]. 
A claim against a governmental entity, or against an 
employee for an act or omission occurring during 
the performance of the employee's duties, within the 
scope of employment, or under color of authority, is 
barred unless notice of claim is filed with the person 
and according to the requirements of Section 63-
30d-401 within one year after the claim arises 
regardless of whether or not the func t ion giving 
rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
4. Utah R. Civ. P. 59 (2004). NEW TRIALS; AMENDMENTS OF 
JUDGMENT: Reproduced in the Addendum hereto. 
5. Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (2003). SUMMARY JUDGMENT: Reproduced 
in the Addendum hereto. 
6. Utah R. App. P. 24 (2004). BRIEFS: Reproduced in the 
Addendum hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Because the procedural history of this case is addressed in detail 
above, Defendants' Statement of the Case will be brief. This case arises out 
of the former employment of Plaintiff as a Police Officer for Lehi City. 
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Plaintiff ultimately resigned and subsequently filed suit against the 
Defendants making whistle blower claims and alleging intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, constructive termination, defamation and punitive 
damages. 
After the close of discovery, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment on all causes of action, which the Trial Court granted. (Mot., R. 
87; RuL, R. 166; Or., R. 195). At the same time, the Trial Court denied 
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(RuL, R. 166; Or., R. 195). Plaintiff then filed a Motion for New Trial which 
the Court also denied. (Mot. R. 169; RuL, R. 206; Od., R. 213). 
In addition to the procedural history of this case, the following facts, 
taken from Defendants' Statement of Facts relied upon in their Motion for 
Summary Judgment, are undisputed and relevant to the issues: 
1. Plaintiff Charles Douglas Fannen ("Fannen") officially started 
work as a Police Officer for the Lehi City Police Department ("the 
Department") on April 27, 1998. Prior to that time, beginning in July of 
1997, he worked for Lehi City as a Reserve Police Officer. (Defs.' Mem. in 
Suppt. of S.J., R. 126). 
2. Approximately four to five months after he started as a Police 
Officer, in about July or August of 1998, Fannen started receiving flyers in 
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his mailbox at work making derogatory comments and jokes about him 
and/or his wife. (Defs.' Mem. in Suppt. of S.J., R. 126 ). 
3. In approximately December of 1998, Fannen anonymously 
contacted the Workers Compensation Fund Fraud Investigation Department 
to report what he alleged was a fraudulent Workers Compensation claim 
made by Defendant Sergeant James Munson ("Defendant Munson"), also a 
Lehi City employee. (Defs.' Mem. in Suppt. of S.J., R. 126 ). 
4. Fannen made the report because he thought the Department 
through Chief of Police and Defendant Karl Zimmerman ("Chief 
Zimmerman") was "covering up" for Defendant Munson. (Defs.' Mem. in 
Suppt. of S.J., R. 126 ). 
5. In late fall of 1999, Fannen went to Chief Zimmerman, showed 
him the notes he had received in his mailbox, and requested Chief 
Zimmerman to do an investigation and address it at the next Department 
meeting, which Chief Zimmerman did. (Defs.' Mem. in Suppt. of S.J., R. 
125). 
6. After the Department meeting, the notes stopped for more than 
1 V2 years. Then in approximately May of 2001, Fannen received another 
note in his mailbox stating: "leave . . . leave . . . leave." (Defs.' Mem. in 
Suppt. ofS.J., R. 125). 
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7. After the "leave . . . leave . . . leave" note, Chief Zimmerman 
called a follow-up Department meeting during which he stated to the 
Department members that the notes better stop and if it happened again, 
every Department member would undergo a lie detector test, including 
Fannen and even Chief Zimmerman himself. (Defs.' Mem. in Suppt. of S.J., 
R. 125). 
8. Fannen does not know who left the notes in his mailbox. When 
asked during his deposition if he was accusing Defendant Munson of 
leaving the notes, Fannen responded: "I do not know who did it. . . I do not 
know - who did it." (Defs.' Mem. in Suppt. of S.J., R. 125). 
9. In approximately May of 2001, Fannen was traveling in Colorado 
when some truck drivers on the highway made him angry, at which time 
Fannen flashed his police badge at the truckers. (Defs.' Mem. in Suppt. of 
S.J., R. 125). 
10. On June 20, 2001, Fannen was asked to resign, and did resign.* 
(Defs/ Mem. in Suppt. of S.J., R. 124). 
11. Fannen was told the reason the Department wanted his 
resignation was because of the incident with the truck drivers in Colorado. 
(Defs.' Mem. in Suppt. of S.J., R. 124). 
1
 Fannen's last day of work with Lehi City was June 20, 2001. 
However, his salary and benefits continued to September 30, 2001. 
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12. Fannen acknowledges that the emotional distress he claims to 
have suffered as a result of Defendants' alleged actions ended on the date 
he resigned, June 20, 2001. (Defs.' Mem. in Suppt. of S.J., R. 124). 
13. Fannen testified that he had a good reputation as a Police 
Officer and although he believes the Defendants attempted to ruin that 
reputation, they did not succeed in doing so. (Defs.' Mem. in Suppt. of S.J., 
R. 124). 
14. On December 9, 2001, Fannen was hired as a Police Officer by 
the Alpine/Highland Police Department. (Defs.' Mem. in Suppt. of S.J., R. 
124). 
15. When he applied for a position with the Alpine/Highland Police 
Department, Fannen had to undergo both a written and verbal 
psychological evaluation and never mentioned on either that he was 
suffering any emotional distress. (Defs.' Mem. in Suppt. of S.J., R. 124). 
16. On February 4, 2002, Fannen filed a Notice of Claim with Lehi 
City. (Defs.'Mem. in Suppt. of S.J., R. 123). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Should this Court determine to reach the issues, Defendants make 
the following arguments in favor of affirming the Trial Court's Rulings: 
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THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION. THE COURT APPROPRIATELY 
RULED THAT ITS HANDLING OF THE MOTION TO 
STRIKE WAS NOT DILATORY AS ALLEGED BY 
PLAINTIFF. THEREFORE, THERE WAS NO ERROR 
IN LAW THAT WOULD WARRANT A NEW TRIAL. 
APPLYING A CORRECTNESS STANDARD, THE 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE BECAUSE THE 
COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE LAW TO 
DETERMINE THAT DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUPPORTING 
MEMORANDUM COMPLIED WITH THE 
APPLICABLE RULES. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO ALL CAUSES OF 
ACTION BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO OPPOSE 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION. IN ADDITION, SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE ON THE MERITS. 
A. Summary Judgment was proper on procedural 
grounds because Plaintiff did not oppose the 
motion. 
B. Summary Judgment was appropriate on the 
merits as to each cause of action as follows: 1) 
Plaintiffs whistle blower claims were not 
timely filed and in any case, Plaintiff has no 
evidence to show who committed the alleged 
acts. 2) The alleged acts at issue do not reach 
the level of intolerance necessary to succeed 
on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress and Plaintiff did not suffer severe 
emotional distress. 3) Defendants violated no 
public policy that would create an exception to 
Plaintiff's at will employment s ta tus and 
support a constructive termination claim. 4) 
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Plaintiff admits he suffered no harm to his 
reputation, so his defamation action cannot 
stand. 5) Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney's 
fees or punitive damages because those are 
not permitted by statute. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs appeal should be dismissed for his failure to preserve the 
issues for review. However, should this Court determine to reach the 
issues, the Trial Court's rulings should be affirmed on the following 
grounds. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE COURT DID 
NOT COMMIT ERROR IN ITS HANDLING OF THE 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
The Trial Court's denial of Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial was not an 
abuse of discretion. In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for new 
trial, the appellate court will reverse the trial court only for abuse of 
discretion based upon the background of the situation underlying the 
denial. Shreeve, 551 P.2d at 1262. 
Plaintiff does not argue in his Appellate Brief that the Trial Court 
abused its discretion, but simply claims that the Court should have 
considered his arguments regarding the appropriate statute of limitations 
on Plaintiffs whistle blower claim. However, the Trial Court did not reach 
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that issue because Plaintiff failed to address it in his moving memorandum, 
raising it only in his Supplemental Memorandum (discussed further infra). 
Based on prior rulings of this Court, the Trial Court would have 
committed error if the Court had considered the arguments made in the 
Supplemental Memorandum, therefore, even if he had sought leave of Court 
to file the Supplemental Memorandum, the Trial Court could not have 
considered the arguments raised therein. Id. In the case of U.P.C., Inc. v. 
R.O.A. General, Inc., 990 P,2d 945, 953 (Utah App. 1999), this Court 
disposed of an appellant's argument because he did not raise the argument 
in his moving papers below, but did so for the first time in his reply brief in 
support of his motion to revise the Trial Court's Summary Judgment ruling. 
Id. 
Instead of citing to appropriate legal authority in support of his 
arguments, Plaintiff simply argues that the Trial Court erred in considering 
certain documents (specifically a letter from Plaintiff to Lehi City) in ruling 
on Summary Judgment , yet refusing to consider the same documents when 
Plaintiff attempted to rely upon them in his Supplemental Memorandum, 
stating "[w]hat is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander." (PL's App. 
Br., p. 12). This argument not only fails to cite any legal authority, but it 
is entirely misguided. First, Plaintiff could not rely on such evidence 
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because it was contained in a pleading the Trial Court would not consider 
because Plaintiff failed to seek leave of court. 
Second, the Trial Court made clear that even if the Supplemental 
Memorandum would have been properly filed, Plaintiff failed to provide 
supporting sworn testimony or an affidavit to rebut the sworn testimony in 
Plaintiffs deposition cited in support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. 204). Therefore, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion 
in refusing to consider Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum and denying 
Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE BECAUSE 
DEFENDANTS ADEQUATELY PRESENTED THEIR 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The Trial Court properly denied Plaintiffs Motion to Strike because 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum 
met the requirements of Rule 4-501 and U.R.C.P. 56. Defendants' Motion 
and Supporting Memorandum contained an appropriate statement of facts, 
citations to the record with attached documentation and extensive legal 
citations and argument. As the Court stated, Defendants' moving papers 
contained the elements required under U.R.C.P. 56 and Rule 4-501. (R. 
166-164). Therefore, any technical error in Defendants'moving papers (e.g. 
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the heading on the fact section did not contain the word "undisputed") was 
harmless. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held consistent with the Trial Court's 
ruling, noting that where a party's memorandum otherwise contained the 
necessary elements, with applicable citations and legal authority, "the 
failure to comply with the technical requirements of Rule 4-501(2)(B) [was 
harmless]/ ' Salt Lake County v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 89 P.3d 155, 
160 (Utah 2004). 
On the other hand, Plaintiffs non-compliance with Rule 56(e) and 
Rule 4-501 was not simply technical, Plaintiff failed to oppose Defendants' 
Motion whatsoever. The only response Plaintiff filed to Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment was the Motion to Strike, which failed to raise even 
a single disputed fact or otherwise substantively oppose Defendants' 
Motion. Instead, the Motion to Strike argued that Defendants' motion was 
facially deficient. Accordingly, even reviewing the Trial Court's decision 
under a correctness standard, the Court properly applied the applicable 
rules to deny Plaintiffs Motion to Strike. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS ON ALL 
CAUSES OF ACTION ON THE MERITS AND FOR 
P L A I N T I F F ' S FAILURE TO O P P O S E 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
A. Summary Judgment Was Appropriate on 
Procedural Grounds 
The Trial Court's grant of Summary Judgment was appropriate and 
should be affirmed because Plaintiff failed to comply with applicable 
procedural rules, specifically U.R.C.P. 56(e). That Rule provides: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party 
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, mus t set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial. If he does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against 
him. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (2003). 
In considering a grant of summary judgment, appellate courts review 
the trial court's legal determinations for correctness, giving no deference, 
and reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
However, the Utah Supreme Court has also made clear that although the 
court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, 
this does not mean a party can simply rest on his pleadings. Peterson v. 
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Coca-Cola USA, 48 P.3d 941 , 944 (Utah 2002). Specifically, the court in 
Peterson stated: 
Although upon summary judgment the court must 
view all facts and inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving party, it may not assume facts for which 
no evidence is offered. 'Allegations or denials in the 
pleadings are not a sufficient basis for opposing 
summary judgment. ' The non-moving party 'must 
set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial.' 
Id. at 947 (citations omitted). 
Once the proponent of summary judgment establishes a prima facie 
case, the burden then shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to 
provide evidence in opposition to the motion and supporting the elements 
of that party's claim. Id. at 990, citing Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); Thayne v. 
Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994). Defendants properly 
supported their Motion for Summary Judgment with citations to the file and 
supporting documents attached, thus establishing a prima facie case. It 
was then Plaintiffs burden to respond with evidence opposing Defendants' 
Motion and supporting the elements of his claim. The Trial Court properly 
ruled that Plaintiff failed to meet that burden because he did not properly 
oppose Summary Judgment . (R. 166 - 162). Plaintiffs Motion to Strike was 
his only response to Defendants' Motion and did not make even a single 
contention that disputed issues of fact precluded Summary Judgment. Nor 
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did the Motion to Strike otherwise address the merits of Defendants' 
Motion, but simply argued that the Motion and Supporting Memorandum 
were facially deficient. (R. 134-131, passim). 
The case of Campbell, Maack & Sessions v. Debry, 38 P.3d 984 (Utah 
App. 2001) further supports the Trial Court's ruling. In Debry this Court 
held that the Trial Court properly granted the appellee's motion for 
summary judgment because the appellant had not satisfied the 
requirements of Rule 56(e). id. at 990. Specifically, this Court stated: 
[Plaintiff] failed to submit either an affidavit or any 
other acceptable evidentiary materials to rebut the 
motion [for summary judgment]. Accordingly, the 
trial court properly assumed that no genuine issues 
of material fact existed and correctly proceeded to 
determine whether CMS was entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. 
Id. at 990. See also, State Bank of Southern Utah v. Troy Hygro Systems, 
Inc., 894 P.2d 1270, 1277 (Utah App. 1995) (summary judgment 
appropriate where opposing parry failed to meet burden of presenting 
evidence under Rule 56(e) raising credible issue of material fact). 
Despite the fact he failed to dispute Defendants' Statement of Facts 
presented in their Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff nonetheless 
argues that the Trial Court improperly weighed evidence by failing to 
examine allegations in his Complaint which he believes controvert the 
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Defendants' Statement of Facts. (PL's App. Br., pp. 18-19 and 24-25). On 
this point, Plaintiff cites Francisconi v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 36 P.3d 
999 (Utah App. 2001). However, nowhere in Francisconi does the court 
address the instant situation where the party challenging the trial court's 
weighing of the evidence failed to oppose summary judgment. 
Pursuant to Peterson, Plaintiff cannot simply fail to oppose Summary 
Judgment and then rest on his Complaint. Peterson, 48 P.3d at 947. If 
Plaintiff wanted the Trial Court to consider facts alleged in his Complaint, 
he should have brought those facts before the Court through an opposition 
to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and properly supported 
those facts. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot simply point to his pleadings to 
argue for reversal of the Trial Court's ruling granting Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment . Rather, Plaintiff is bound to the facts outlined above, 
which the Court deemed admitted and upon which Summary Judgment 
was appropriate. 
B. Summary Judgment Was Appropriate 
as a Matter of Law as to Each Cause of 
Action. 
Plaintiffs First Cause of Action: Whistle Blower 
Claims 
Based on the applicable statute of limitations, Summary Judgment 
was an appropriate ruling, dismissing Plaintiffs cause of action under the 
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Whistle Blower Act. Pursuant to the Utah Code, an employee making a 
claim under the Whistle Blower Act must do so within 180 days "after the 
occurrence of the alleged violation " Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-4(2) (2003). 
Based on the undisputed facts, the "occurrence of the alleged violation" was 
the day Plaintiff left Lehi City, June 20, 2001, which is also the same day 
Defendants' alleged acts ended. (See, Facts 10 and 12 supra). Plaintiff did 
not file his Notice of Claim with the State until February 4, 2002, more than 
180 days after his resignation on June 20, 2001. (See, Fact 16 supra). 
Although Plaintiff filed a Notice of Claim within the one-year period 
prescribed by the Governmental Immunity Act. U.C.A. § 63-30-13 [now § 
63-30d-402], the specific limitation period provided for in the Whistle 
Blower Act applies. 
First, the Whistle Blower Act applies only to plaintiffs who are public 
employees. Obviously the Utah Legislature intended to create a shorter 
statute of limitations than the one-year notice period provided for in the 
Governmental Immunity Act. Otherwise, the Legislature simply would have 
deferred to that statute of limitations since under both statutes, the 
defendant is the State, a governmental entity and/or a government 
employee (s). 
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Second, the Whistle Blower Act's statute of limitations applies because 
it is more specific than the limitation of action provision in the 
Governmental Immunity Act. Utah Courts have held that when two 
statutes conflict, the more specific statute applies. See, Floyd v. Western 
Surgical Assoc, Inc., 773 P.2d 401, 404 (Utah App. 1989) (specific statute 
controls when two statutes treat same subject matter, but one is general 
and the other is specific). Both the Governmental Immunity Act and the 
Whistle Blower Act address suits against governmental entities and/or 
government employees. However, the Whistle Blower Act is specific to 
plaintiffs who are employees of governmental agencies, whereas the one-
year limitation period in the Governmental Immunity Act applies generally 
to any plaintiff seeking to sue the State, a government entity and/or 
government employees. Therefore, the Whistle Blower Act applies and the 
180-day statute of limitations precludes Plaintiffs First Cause of Action. 
In his Appellate Brief, Plaintiff cites Hall v. Utah State Dept of 
Corrections, 24 P.3d 958 (Utah 2001) in support of his argument that the 
general statute of limitations in the Governmental Immunity Act trumps the 
specific provision in the Whistle Blower Act. (PL's App. Br., pp. 9-12). 
Plaintiffs interpretation of Hall is erroneous. In fact, Hall stands for the 
exact opposite. As Plaintiff points out, Hall does acknowledge the general 
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rule that courts look to the true intent of the Legislature through the plain 
language of a statute. However, Plaintiff fails to point out that the Utah 
Supreme Court in Hall also held that specific statutory provisions control 
over general provisions. Id. at 963. 
In Hall the specific provisions of the Whistle Blower Act trumped the 
general language contained in the Governmental Immunity Act rendering 
the government and its agencies immune from the types of claims brought 
by the claimant in Hall Id. at 963-64. The claimant in Hall was an 
employee of the Utah Department of Corrections ("UDC"). The claimant 
reported an incident to his superiors wherein one inmate was hazed by 
other inmates, allegedly with the encouragement of certain UDC officers. 
Id. at 960. The UDC ultimately began an investigation and the claimant 
resigned shortly thereafter. Id. The claimant later sued the UDC under the 
Whistle Blower Act, alleging he was unable to secure a new job in law 
enforcement because the UDC informed potential employers that the 
claimant resigned with disciplinary action pending. Id. at 960-61. The 
claimant also alleged that he was subjected to harassment and verbal 
threats after he made the report. Id. at 961. 
The trial court dismissed a majority of the plaintiffs claims because 
they were time-barred under the 180-day statute of limitations under the 
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Whistle Blower Act, which left only one remaining claim because that claim 
arose later and was not time barred under the 180-day provision. Id. 
Therefore, the court only entertained the claim that was not time barred, 
impliedly ruling that the 180-day limitation period in the Whistle Blower Act 
applies to the filing of a Notice of Claim. Id. 
The claimant in Hall argued that he should not have to comply with 
the Governmental Immunity Act whatsoever because the Whistle Blower Act 
created an exception to governmental immunity. This is not the argument 
Defendants make. Rather, Defendants acknowledge that the Governmental 
Immunity Act is applicable to Plaintiffs claims, but certain provisions of the 
Governmental Immunity Act must give way to specific provisions in the 
Whistle Blower Act, e.g. the requirement that plaintiff make his claim within 
180 days. U.C.A. § 67-21-4(2). 
Hall supports Defendants' argument on this point, holding that 
"where the government grants statutory rights of action against itself, any 
conditions placed on those rights must be followed precisely." Id. at 965, 
citing Hamilton v. Salt Lake City, 106 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1940). The 
Utah government granted a right of action against itself through the Whistle 
Blower Act and the conditions placed on that right must be followed 
precisely. The 180-day limitation period in the Whistle Blower Act is a 
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"condition placed on the right of action against the government" and 
therefore must be followed precisely. Plaintiff did not send a notice of claim 
until February 4, 2002 {See, Fact 16 supra). 
The Hall court ultimately held that although the claimant did have to 
send notice of claim under the Governmental Immunity Act, the general 
provisions of that Act granting the government immunity from suit, had to 
give way to the specific language of the Whistle Blower Act permitting suits 
against the government under the circumstances at issue in Hall Id. at 
963-64. Specifically, the court stated: 
While the Governmental Immunity Act grants broad, 
background immunity to the state and its 
subdivisions in their roles as public servants, the 
Act also explicitly recognizes that such immunity 
can be statutorily waived. Here, the Whistle Blower 
Act has done just that, allowing claims to be brought 
against an 'employing state agency or political 
subdivision of the state' . . . Barring such claims 
through government immunity would nullify a very 
specific statutory provision at the expense of 
preserving a much more general one. . . . 
Id. at 963-64 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Therefore, Hall is 
supportive of the Trial Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's whistle blower claims 
based on statute of limitations. 
Moreover, even if Plaintiff had timely filed his whistle blower claim, 
Summary Judgment was appropriate because he has provided no evidence 
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of who committed the alleged acts. Specifically, Plaintiff testified that he 
does not know who committed the acts. (See, Fact 8 supra). Therefore, a 
jury could not find that the named Defendants committed the alleged acts, 
and therefore could not find the requisite liability. Even viewing the facts 
in the light most favorable to Plaintiff then, Summary Judgment was 
appropriate dismissing his whistle blower claims. 
Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action: Intentional Infliction 
Of Emotional Distress 
The Trial Court properly concluded that based on the undisputed 
facts, Plaintiff could not satisfy the elements necessary to establish a claim 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Utah Supreme Court has 
established the necessary elements to pursue a claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, holding that the claimant mus t plead facts 
demonstrating the defendant: 
Intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the 
plaintiff (a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional 
distress, or (b) where any reasonable person would 
have known that such would result; and his actions 
are of such a nature as to be considered outrageous 
and intolerable in that they offend against the 
generally accepted standards of decency and 
morality. 
Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 70 P.3d 17, 30 (Utah 2003) 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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Based on the undisputed facts, Plaintiff has presented no evidence to 
show that any of the Defendants left the notes at issue in his Department 
mailbox or committed any acts with the purpose of inflicting emotional 
distress. Even if Plaintiff had such evidence, the acts alleged cannot be 
considered so outrageous and intolerable that they offend against generally 
accepted standards of decency and morality. The notes placed in Plaintiffs 
Department mailbox may have been unprofessional, insulting and even 
childish. However, to be considered outrageous, "the conduct must evoke 
outrage or revulsion; it must be more than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair 
. . . [liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress] clearly does not 
extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, 
or other trivialities." Id. at 32. Therefore, while the behavior of some 
Department members may have been insulting or even threatening, this 
does not rise to the level of outrageous under Utah case law. 
Moreover, in the context of discharge from employment, the Utah 
Court of Appeals has held that although every employee who feels he has 
been wronged by his employer suffers some level of emotional anguish, 
discharge from employment does not rise to outrageous or intolerable 
conduct on behalf of the employer which would give rise to a cause of action 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Robertson v. Utah Fuel Co., 
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889 P.2d 1382, 1388-89 (Utah App. 1995). In Robertson, an employee was 
required to discuss his drug addiction with subordinates and was later 
discharged. The court held that the claimant's discharge from employment, 
even when coupled with the fact that the employee had to discuss his drug 
addiction with co-workers, still did not constitute outrageous or intolerable 
conduct which could establish a prima facie claim of emotional distress 
against the employer. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment in favor of the employer. Id. 
Even if Defendants' alleged conduct were to reach the requisite level 
of intolerability, Plaintiffs cause of action still fails because he did not suffer 
severe emotional distress. Shortly after he left Lehi City, Plaintiff applied 
for employment with the Alpine /Highland Police Department where he had 
to undergo a psychological evaluation. Neither on the written nor oral part 
of the evaluation did Plaintiff even mention that he was suffering any 
emotional distress whatsoever. (See, Fact 15 supra). Therefore, the Court's 
grant of Summary Judgment was appropriate dismissing Plaintiffs claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
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Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action: Constructive 
Termination 
Summary Judgment was appropriate dismissing Plaintiffs claim for 
constructive termination because he cannot show that the Defendants 
violated any public policy warranting the cause of action. An employment 
relationship with no specified term of duration is at-will, meaning the 
employee can leave for any reason and the employer can terminate the 
relationship for any reason. In order to overcome this presumption and 
proceed with a claim for constructive termination, the Utah Supreme Court 
has held: 
An at-will employee may overcome [the] presumption 
by demonstrating that (1) there is an implied or 
express agreement that the employment may be 
terminated only for cause or upon satisfaction of 
another agreed upon condition; (2) a statute or 
regulation restricts the right of an employer to 
terminate an employee under certain conditions; or 
(3) the termination of employment constitutes a 
violation of a clear and substantial policy. 
Burton, M.D. v. Exam Center Industrial & General Medial Clinic, Inc., 994 P.2d 
1261, 1264 (Utah 2000). See also, Rackley v. Fairview Care Centers, Inc., 23 
P.3d 1022 (Utah 2001); Fox v. MCI Communications Corp., 931 P.2d 857 
(Utah 1997). 
The first of the three exceptions to at-will employment does not apply 
because Plaintiff does not claim an express or implied employment 
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agreement existed that would modify his at-will employment status. 
Although the second exception may hypothetically apply based on the 
Whistle Blower Act, that statute is Plaintiffs remedy and as demonstrated 
by the undisputed facts, the statute of limitations ran before Plaintiff filed 
his Notice of Claim. Therefore, the only way Plaintiff could succeed on a 
claim of wrongful termination is to show that Lehi City violated a clear and 
substantial public policy in terminating his employment. 
The Burton court stated that not every employment termination which 
violates some public policy is actionable. The public policy violated must be 
"clear and substantial," and although declarations of public policy may be 
found in constitutions and statutes, not all statements therein are 
expressions of public policy. Burton, 994 P.2d at 1264 (citations omitted). 
Whether a public policy alleged to be violated is clear and substantial 
is a question of law. Rackley, 23 P.3d at 1025. In making this legal 
determination, courts are careful to keep the public policy exception narrow 
to avoid unreasonably eliminating an employer's discretion to discharge 
employees. Id. at 1026. Therefore, public policy will protect only those 
principles that are so substantial and fundamental there can be no 
question as to their importance for promoting the public good. Id. at 1026-
27. 
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In Burton, a physician claimed his employer terminated him based on 
his age. Although Utah has an Anti-Discrimination Act prohibiting 
termination of employees over age 40 because of their age, the Act declared 
no "clear and substantial" public policy against doing so. Therefore, there 
was no support to create a cause of action for wrongful termination. 
Despite the fact the Legislature saw fit to draft the statute, the statute did 
not demonstrate a pubic policy which is so important to promoting the 
public benefit on which Plaintiff could succeed. Therefore, the Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed the lower Court's grant of summary judgment for 
the employer. Id. at 1029-30. 
Plaintiff s fourth cause of action: defamation 
Dismissal of Plaintiffs defamation action was proper where Plaintiff 
cannot show that he suffered any harm based on Defendants' alleged 
actions. Plaintiffs Complaint does not specify whether he is making a per 
quad or per se defamation claim. However, Plaintiff did not make a claim 
for special damages for defamation and, therefore, pursuant to Utah law 
Plaintiffs defamation claim must be per se. Allred v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318, 
320-21 (Utah 1979). In order to constitute defamation per se, thus 
obviating the need to show special harm, the defamatory words at issue 
must fall into one of four categories: charge of criminal conduct; charge of 
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loathsome disease; charge of conduct incompatible with the exercise of a 
lawful business or profession; and, charge of unchastity of a woman. Id. 
at 320. The only possible applicable category in this case is charge of 
conduct incompatible with the plaintiffs trade or profession. 
In addition to falling into one of the four categories, it is necessary for 
the plaintiff to show that as a result of the alleged defamatory words, he 
suffered actual harm. Id. at 322. Even if Plaintiff could demonstrate any 
statement by one of the Defendants attacked his fitness for engaging in his 
profession, by his own testimony Plaintiff suffered no damage. Plaintiff 
testified at his deposition that although he believed the Defendants 
attempted to harm his reputation as a Police Officer, they were not 
successful in doing so. (See, Fact 13 supra). Therefore, based on the 
undisputed fact that Plaintiff suffered no harm, Summary Judgment was 
appropriate dismissing Plaintiffs defamation claim. 
Plaintiffs Fifth Claim: Attorney's Fees and Punitive 
Damages2 
Because Plaintiff has no evidence to succeed on his whistle blower 
claim, he is not entitled to attorney's fees under that statute. Moreover, 
2
 A claimant cannot plead punitive damages as an independent 
cause of action. Norman v. Arnold, 57 P.3d 997, 1001, n. 2 (Utah 2002). 
However, since the Trial Court dismissed punitive damages as a cause of 
action, it is argued as such here. (R. 159). 
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pursuant to the Whistle Blower Act, Plaintiff would be entitled to nothing 
other than injunctive relief or actual damages. See, Utah Code Ann., § 67-
21-4(2) (2003). Thus, even if the statute of limitations had not run on this 
claim, Plaintiff would not be entitled to punitive damages. Moreover, in no 
case can any claimant recover punitive damages against a governmental 
entity and/or its employees. The Utah Code states that no judgment may 
be rendered against a governmental entity for punitive damages. U.C.A. § 
63-30-22(l)(a) [now § 63-30d-603]. Therefore, Plaintiffs claims for 
attorney's fees, costs and punitive damages were properly dismissed on 
Summary Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Trial Court's rulings should be affirmed. 
The Trial Court properly granted Summary Judgment on all causes of 
action both on the merits and because Plaintiffs Motion to Strike failed to 
properly oppose the Motion for Summary Judgment. Moreover, the 
subsequent Motion for New Trial was properly denied, as Plaintiff failed to 
provide the requisite support to warrant a new trial. Accordingly, 
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Defendants respectfully request the Court of Appeals to affirm the Trial 
Court's rulings. 
DATED this J day of February 2005. n _ __, 
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peal, and if the facts already appearing in the Cited in State v Classon, 935 R2d 524 (Utah 
record are sufficient to make the claim, a re- Ct. App 1997), cert granted, 945 P2d 1118 
mand is not needed If defendant merely hopes (Utah 1997), State v Bredehofb, 966 P2d 285 
to discover evidence suggesting ineffectiveness, (Utah Ct App. 1998), cert denied, 982 R2d 88 
a remand is not allowed, because the purpose of (Utah 1999), State v. Simmons, 2000 UT App 
the rule is not to hold a "mini-trial" on ineffec- 190, 398 Utah Adv Rep 7; State v Mecham, 
tiveness of counsel. State v. Johnston, 2000 UT 2000 UT App 247, 9 P3d 777. 
App 290, 13 R3d 175, 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency 
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of 
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set 
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page 
references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to 
the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each 
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the 
trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved 
in the trial court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to 
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the 
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the 
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) 
of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court 
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall 
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this 
rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably 
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made 
in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under 
which the argument is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument The 'argument shall contain the contentions and rea-
sons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the 
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citatiofis 
to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party 
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports 
the challenged finding. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought 
(a)(ll) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is 
necessary under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the 
brief unless doing so makes the brie£ unreasonably thick. If the addendum is 
bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The 
addendum shall contain a copy df: 
(a)(ll)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central 
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
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(a)(ll)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of 
Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the 
appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter 
service; and 
(a)(ll)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance 
to the determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of 
the court's oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not 
include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is 
dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the adden-
dum of the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the 
appellant. 
(c) Reply brief The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the 
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in 
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further 
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs 
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such 
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the 
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual 
names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured 
person/' "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages 
of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any 
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared 
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or 
transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each 
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately 
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by 
the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If 
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, 
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was 
identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall 
not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of 
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum 
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by 
paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of 
this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party 
first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes of 
this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise 
orders. The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The brief 
of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and arguments in-
volved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the appellant 
and shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall then file a brief 
which contains an answer to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-
appellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues raised in the 
appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second brief shall not exceed -2& 
pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not 
to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the appellant's 
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answers to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first 
brief The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of table of contents, table 
of authorities, and addenda and may be exceeded only by permission of the 
court. The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause shown. 
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases 
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for 
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any 
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. 
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant 
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise 
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original 
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter 
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a 
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the 
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for 
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing 
and shall be similarly limited. 
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, 
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free 
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which 
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte 
by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending 
lawyer. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; April 1, 1998; 
November 1, 1999; April 1, 2003.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 24 
(a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts 
have long held. See In re Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 
1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 
P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). "lb successfully 
appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate 
counsel must play the devil's advocate. '[Attor-
neys! must extricate [themselves] from the cli-
ent's shoes and fully assume the adversary's 
position. In order to properly discharge the 
[marshalling] duty..., the challenger must 
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, 
every scrap of competent evidence introduced 
at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists.'" ONEIDA/SLIC, v. 
ONEIDA Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 
872 P.2d 1051,1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) (alter-
ation in original) (quoting West Valley City v. 
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah 
App, 1991)). See also State ex rel. M.S. v. 
Salata, 806 P2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App. 1991); 
Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 
1989); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 
(Utah App. 1990). 
The brief must contain for each issue raised 
on appeal, a statement of the applicable stan-
dard of review and citation of supporting au-
thority. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2003 amend-
ment deleted Subdivision (k) pertaining to brief 
covers. 





—Standard of review. 
—Statement of facts with citation to record. 
Failure to file. 
—Defective appeal. 
Issues not raised at trial. 
- Noncompliance with rule. 




In order to make an argument for an innova-
tive interpretation of a state constitutional pro-
vision textually similar to a federal provision, 
the following points should be developed and 
supported with authority and analysis. First, 
counsel should offer analysis of the unique 
context in which Utah's constitution developed 
with regard to the issue at hand. Second, coun-
sel should demonstrate that state appellate 
courts regularly interpret even textually simi-
lar state constitutional provisions in a manner 
different from federal interpretations of the 
United States Constitution and that it is en-
tirely proper to do so in our federal system. 
Third, citation should be made to authority 
from other states supporting the particular 
construction urged by counsel. State v. Bobo, 
803 P.2d 1268 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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(b) Sections 63-30-14 and 63-30-19 shall not apply. 
(2) Any other claim under this chapter tha t is related to a 
claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection (1) may be brought 
contemporaneously with the claim for attorneys' fees or in a 
subsequent action. 1992 
63-30-11. Claim for injury — tfbtice —- Contents — 
Service — Legal disability -— Appointment of 
guardian ad litem. 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that 
would apply if the claim were against a private person begins 
to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a govern-
mental entity, or against its employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, 
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority 
shall file^ a written notice of claim with the entity before 
maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as govern-
mental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as 
they are known, 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that 
person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian; 
and 
(ii) directed and delivered to: 
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim is 
against an incorporated city or town; 
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against 
a county; 
(C) the superintendent or business adminis-
trator of the board, when the claim is against a 
school district or board of education; 
(D) the president or secretary of the board, 
when the claim is against a special district; 
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is 
against the State of Utah; or 
(F) a member of the governing board, the 
executive director, or executive secretary, when 
the claim is against any other public board, 
commission, or body. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or 
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian at the 
time the claim arises, the claimant may apply to the court 
to extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental 
entity, the court may extend the time for service of 
notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that 
exceeds the applicable statute of limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an exten-
sion, the court shall consider whether the delay in serving 
the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the gov-
ernmental entity in maintaining its defense on the merits. 
(d) (i) If an injury tha t may reasonably be expected to 
result in a claim against a governmental entity is 
sustained by a potential claimant described in Sub-
section (4)(a), t ha t government entity may file a 
request with the court for the appointment of a 
guardian ad litem for the potential claimant. 
(ii) If a guardian ad litem is appointed under this 
Subsection (4)(d), the time for filing a claim under 
Sections 63-30-12 and 63-30-13 begins whenHhe 
order appointing the guardian is issued. 2000 
63-30-12. Claim a g a i n s t s t a t e or i t s emp loyee — Time 
for filing notice. 
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act 
or omission occurring during the performance of the employ-
ee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the 
attorney general within one year after the claim arises, or 
before the expiration of any extension of time granted under 
Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function 
giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
1998 
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its em-
ployee — Time for filing notice. 
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its em-
ployee for an act or omission occurring during the performance 
of the' employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed 
with the governing body of the political subdivision according 
to the requirements of Section 63-30-11 withm one year after 
the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of 
time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or 
not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 1998 
63-30-14. Claim for injury — Approval or denial by 
governmental entity or insurance carrier 
within ninety days. 
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the governmental 
entity or its insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the 
claimant in writing of its approval or denial. A claim shall be 
deemed to have been denied if at the end of the ninety-day 
period the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has 
failed to approve or deny the claim. 1965 
63-30-15. Denia l of claim for injury — Authority and 
t ime for filing act ion against governmental 
entity. 
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action 
in the district court against the governmental entity or an 
employee of the entity. 
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year 
after denial of the claim or within one year after the denial 
period specified in this chapter has expired, regardless of 
whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is charac-
terized as governmental. 1987 
63-30-16. Jurisdiction of district courts over actions — 
Application of Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(1) The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdic-
tion over any action brought under this chapter. 
(2) An action brought under this chapter may not be tried 
as a small claims action and shall be governed by the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent they are consistent with 
this chapter. 1999 
63-30-17. Venue of actions. 
Actions against the state may be brought in the county in 
which the claim arose or in Salt Lake County. Actions against 
a county may be brought in the county in which the claim 
arose, or in the defendant county, or, upon leave granted by a 
district court judge of the defendant county, in any county 
contiguous to the defendant county. Leave may be granted ex 
parte. Actions against all other political subdivisions including 
cities and towns, shall be brought in the county in which the 
political subdivision is located or in the county in which the 
claim arose. 1983 
63-30-18. Compromise and settlement of actions. 
(1) A political subdivision, after conferring with its legal 
officer or other legal counsel if it does not have a legal officer, 
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may compromise and settle any action as to the damages or 
other relief sought. 
(2) The risk manager in the Department of Administrative 
Services may: 
(a) compromise and settle any claim of $25,000 or less 
in damages filed against the state for which the Risk 
Management Fund may be liable; 
(b) with the concurrence of the attorney general or his 
representative and the executive director of the Depart-
ment of Administrative Services, compromise and settle 
any claim of $25,000 to $100,000 in damages for which the 
Risk Management Fund may be liable; and 
(3) The risk manager shall comply with procedures and 
requirements of Title 63, Chapter 38b, in compromising and 
settling any claim of $100,00Q*or more. 1995 
63-30-19. Undertaking required of plaintiff in action. 
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff shall file an 
undertaking in a sum fixed by the court, but in no case less 
than the sum of $300, conditioned upon payment by the 
plaintiff of taxable costs incurred by the governmental entity 
in the action if the plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or fails 
to recover judgment. 1965 
63-30-20. J u d g m e n t against governmenta l ent i ty bars 
action against employee. 
Judgment against a governmental entity in an action 
brought under this act shall constitute a complete bar to any 
action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, 
against the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the 
cla im. 1965 
63-30-21. Repealed . 1978 
63-30-22. Exemplary or puni t ive d a m a g e s prohibited 
— Governmental entity exempt from execu-
tion, attachment, or garnishment. 
(1) (a) No judgment may be rendered against the govern-
mental entity for exemplary or punitive damages. 
(b) The state shall pay any judgment or portion of any 
judgment entered against a state employee in the employ-
ee's personal capacity even if the judgment is for or 
includes exemplary or punitive damages if the state 
would be required to pay the judgment under Section 
63-30-36 or 63-30-37. 
(2) Execution, at tachment, or garnishment may not issue 
against a governmental entity. 1991 
63-30-23. P a y m e n t of c la im or j u d g m e n t against state 
— Presentment for payment. 
Any claim approved by the state as defined by Subsection 
63-30-2(1) or any final judgment obtained against the state 
shall be presented to the state risk manager, or to the office, 
agency, institution or other instrumentality involved for pay-
ment, if payment by said instrumentality is otherwise permit-
ted by law. If such payment is not authorized by law then said 
judgment or claim shall be presented tp the board of examin-
ers and the board shall proceed as provided in Section 63-6-10. 
1987 
63-30-24. Payment of claim or judgment against polit-
ical subdivision — Procedure by governing 
body. 
Any claim approved by a political subdivision or any final 
judgment obtained against a political subdivision shall be 
submitted to the governing body thereof to be paid forthwith 
from the general funds of said political subdivision unless said 
funds are appropriated to some other use or restricted by law 
or contract for other purposes, 1965 
63-30-25. P a y m e n t of c la im or judgment against polit-
ical subdiv i s ion — Instal lment payments . 
If the subdivision is unable to pay the claim or award during 
the current fiscal year it may pay the claim or award in not 
more than ten ensuing annual installments of equal size or in 
such other installments as are agreeable to the claimant. 
1965 
63-30-26, Reserve funds for payment of claims or pur-
chase of insurance created by political subdi-
visions. 
Any political subdivision may create and maintain a reserve 
fund or may jointly with one or more other political subdivi-
sions make contributions to a joint reserve fund, for the 
purpose of making payment of claims against the co-operating 
subdivisions when they become payable pursuant to this 
chapter, or for the purpose of purchasing liability insurance to 
protect the co-operating subdivisions from any or all risks 
created by this chapter. 1983 
63-30-27. Tax levy by polit ical subdivis ions for pay- -
ment of c laims, judgments , or insurance pre-
miums. 
(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, all 
political subdivisions may levy an annual property tax suffi-
cient to pay the following: 
(a) any claim; 
(b) any settlement; 
(c) any judgment, including any judgment against an 
elected official or employee of any political subdivision, 
including peace officers, based upon a claim for punitive 
damages but the authority of a political subdivision for 
the payment of any judgment for punitive damages is 
limited in any individual case to $10,000; 
<d) the costs to defend against any claim, settlement, or 
judgment; or 
(e) the establishment and maintenance of a reserve 
fund for the payment of claims, settlements, or judgments 
as may be reasonably anticipated. 
(2) It is legislative intent that the payments authorized for 
punitive damage judgments or to pay the premium for such 
insurance as authorized is money spent for a public purpose 
within the meaning of this section and Article XIII, Sec. 5, 
Utah Constitution, even though as a result of the levy the 
maximum levy as otherwise restricted by law is exceeded. No 
levy under this section may exceed .0001 per dollar of taxable 
value of taxable property. The revenues derived from this levy 
may not be used for any other purpose than those stipulated in 
this section. 1988 
63-30-28. Liabil ity insurance — Purchase of insurance 
or self- insurance by governmental ent i ty au-
thorized — Establ ishment of trust accounts 
for self- insurance. 
(1) Any governmental entity within the state may purchase 
commercial insurance, self-insure, or self-insure and purchase 
excess commercial insurance in excess of the statutory limits 
of this chapter against any risk created or recognized by this 
chapter or any action for which a governmental entity or its 
employee may be held liable. 
(2) (a) In addition to any other reasonable means of self-
insurance, a governmental entity may self-insure with 
v respect to specified classes of claims by establishing a 
t rust account under the management of an independent 
private trustee having authority with respect to claims of 
that character to expend both principal and earnings of 
the trust account solely to pay the costs of investigation, 
discovery, and other pretrial and litigation expenses in-
cluding attorneys' fees, and to pay all sums for which the 
governmental entity may be adjudged liable or for which 
a compromise settlement may be agreed upon. 
(b) The monies and interest earned on said t rust fund 
shall be subject to investment pursuant to Title 51 , 
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(2) (a) Notwithstanding Section 63-30d-401, a notice of claim for attorneys' 
fees under Subsection 63-30d-301(2)(e) may be filed contemporaneously 
with a petition for review under Section 63-2-404. 
(b) The provisions of Subsection 63-30d-403(l), relating to the govern-
mental entity's response to a claim, and the provisions of 63-30d-601, 
requiring an undertaking, do not apply to a notice of claim for attorneys' 
fees filed contemporaneously with a petition for review under Section 
63-2-404. 
(c) Any other claim under this chapter that is related to a claim for 
attorneys' fees under Subsection 63~30d-301(2)(e) may be brought contem-
poraneously with the claim for attorneys' fees or in a subsequent action. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30d-302, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2004, ch 267, § 49 
L. 2004, ch. 267, § 14. makes the act effective on July 1, 2004 
PART 4 
NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST A GOVERNMENTAL 
ENTITY OR A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE 
63-30d-401. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — 
Service — Legal disability — Appointment of 
guardian ad litem. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), a claim arises when the 
statute of limitations that would apply if the claim were against a private 
person begins to run. 
(b) The statute of limitations does not begin to run until a claimant 
knew, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known: 
(i) that the claimant had a claim against the governmental entity 
or its employee; and 
(ii) the identity of the governmental entity or the name of the 
employee. 
(c) The burden to prove the exercise of reasonable diligence is upon the 
claimant. 
(2) Any person having a claim against a governmental entity, or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of the 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority 
shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, 
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is character-
ized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known; 
and 
(iv) if the claim is being pursued against a governmental employee 
individually as provided in Subsection 63-30d-202(3)(c), the name of 
the employee. 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent, 
attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and 
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(ii) directed and delivered by hand or by mail according to the 
requirements of Section 68-3-8.5 to the office of. 
(A) the city or town clerk, when the claim is against an 
incorporated city or town; 
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against a county, 
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board, 
when the claim is against a school district or board of education; 
(D) the presiding officer or secretary/clerk of the board, when 
the claim is against a special district; 
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is against the State of 
Utah; 
(F) a member of the governing board, the executive director, or 
executive secretary, when the claim is against any other public 
board, commission, or body; or 
(G) the agent authorized by a governmental entity to receive 
the notice of claim by the governmental entity under Subsection 
(5)(e). 
(4) (a) If an injury that may reasonably be expected to result in a claim 
against a governmental entity is sustained by a claimant who is under the 
age of majority or mentally incompetent, that governmental entity may 
file a request with the court for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for 
the potential claimant. 
(b) If a guardian ad litem is appointed, the time for filing a claim under 
Section 63-30d-402 begins when the order appointing the guardian is 
issued. 
(5) (a) Each governmental entity subject to suit under this chapter shall file 
a statement with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code 
within the Department of Commerce containing: 
(i) the name and address of the governmental entity; 
(ii) the office or agent designated to receive a notice of claim; and 
(iii) the address at which it is to be directed and delivered. 
(b) Each governmental entity shall update its statement as necessary to 
ensure that the information is accurate. 
(c) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall develop a 
form for governmental entities to complete that provides the information 
required by Subsection (5)(a). 
(d) (i) Newly incorporated municipalities shall file the statement re-
quired by Subsection (5)(a) at the time that the statement of incorpo-
ration and boundaries is filed with the lieutenant governor under 
Section 10-1-106. 
(ii) Newly incorporated special districts shall file the statement 
required by Subsection (5)(a) at the time that the written notice of 
creation of the district is filed with the State Tax Commission and 
State Auditor under Sections 17A-1-102 and 17B-3-215. 
(e) A governmental entity may, in its statement, identify an agent 
authorized by the entity to accept notices of claim on its behalf. 
(6) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall: 
(a) maintain an index of the statements required by this section 
arranged both alphabetically by entity and by county of operation; and 
(b) make the indices available to the public both electronically and via 
hard copy. 
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(7) A governmental entity may not challenge the validity of a notice of claim 
on the grounds that it was not directed and delivered to the proper office or 
agent if the error is caused by the governmental entity's failure to file or update 
the statement required by Subsection (5). 
History: C. 1953, 63-30d-401, enacted by 
L. 2004, ch. 267, § 15. 
Coordination clause. — Laws 2004, ch. 
267, § 51 specifies the wording of Subsection 
(3)(b)(ii)(A) to coordinate the passage of ch. 267 
and L. 2004, ch. 202. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 2004, ch. 267, § 49 
makes the act effective on July 1, 2004. 




Assignment of municipal debt. 
Clear statement of claims required. 
Conditions for right to recover. 
Defendant's capacity. 
Failure to file claim. 
Notice. 
Sufficiency of notice. 
—Damages. 
—Nature of claim asserted. 
—Parties. 
—Statement of facts. 
Waiver of objections by city. 
Constitutionality. 
Functions of the notice of claim requirement 
in giving the affected governmental entity an 
opportunity to promptly investigate and rem-
edy defects immediately, in avoiding unneces-
sary litigation, and in minimizing difficulties 
which might attend changes in administration 
provide sufficient justification for its imposition 
as to governmental but not other tort-feasors, 
and therefore notice requirement does not deny 
equal protection. Sears v. Southworth, 563 P.2d 
192 (Utah 1977). 
Application. 
While failure to comply with the Immunity 
Act applies to claims for conduct by governmen-
tal employees actually occurring in that capac-
ity, it is not invoked for the personal tortious 
conduct of a person who happens to also be a 
governmental employee merely because he so 
asserts. Crisman v. Hallows, 2000 UT App 104, 
999 R2d 1249. 
Assignment of municipal debt. 
Assignment directing city to pay debt it owes 
assignor to assignee is not kind of claim re-
quired to be submitted to city in accordance 
with this statute. Cooper v. Holder, 21 Utah 2d 
40, 440 P.2d 15 (1968) (decided under former 
law). 
Clear statement of claims required. 
The purpose of notice-of-claim requirement is 
to require every claimant to state clearly all of 
the elements of his claims to the board of 
commissioners or city council for allowance as a 
condition precedent to his right to sue the city 
and recover his damages in an ordinary action. 
Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 134 P. 
1167 (1913). 
Conditions for right to recover. 
Statutory right to recover is available only 
upon compliance with the conditions upon 
which right is conferred. One who seeks to 
enforce the right must by allegation and proof 
bring himself within the conditions prescribed 
thereby. Hamilton v. Salt Lake City, 99 Utah 
362, 106 P.2d 1028 (1940). 
Defendant's capacity. 
Because it was clear that defendant engaged 
in the conduct complained of while performing 
his duties as a state employee and the plaintiff 
was aware that the defendant claimed to have 
acted under color of authority, the plaintiff 
could not complain on appeal that the Govern-
mental Immunity Act did not apply because he 
meant to sue defendant as an ordinary individ-
ual, not for anything he did in the course of his 
employment by the state. Nielson v. Gurley, 888 
P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 
P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). 
Failure to file claim. 
Because no claim was filed as required by 
this section, action to recover moneys expended 
to construct bridge which city had agreed to 
construct was barred. Thomas E. Jeremy Es-
tate v. Salt Lake City, 87 Utah 370,49 P.2d 405 
(1934). 
Exceptional circumstances were not present 
to allow a suit for injuries sustained in a plane 
crash, since the fact that the plane crashed 
gave the plaintiff reasonable grounds to 
question whether a city was enforcing its ordi-
nance and requiring an airline regulated by the 
city to keep its airplanes in airworthy condi-
tion. Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125 
(Utah 1992). 
A potential plaintiff's claim that he was pre-
vented from discovering a cause of action for a 
plane crash in which he was injured because 
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notice of claim, 76 A.L.IUd 1244. 
Local government tort liability: minority as 
affecting notice of claim requirement, 58 
A.L.R.4th 402. 
Insufficiency of notice of claim against munic-
ipality as regards statement of place where 
accident occurred, 69 A.L.R,4th 484. 
Complaint as satisfying requirement of no-
tice of claim upon states, municipalities, and 
other political subdivisions, 45 A.L.R.5th 109. 
Persons or entities upon whom notice of in-
jury or claim against state or state agencies 
ANALYSIS 
Administrative proceedings. 
Amendments to complaint. 
Cause of action. 
Claims barred. 
Claims by minors. 
Claims for death. 






Necessity for presentation of claim. 
Notice. 
Quiet title actions. 
Recovery of real property. 
Remedy for wrongful act. 
Administrative proceedings. 
Tenured teacher seeking reinstatement 
following decision to terminate his services had 
no claim for breach of contract until after ad-
verse result at administrative hearing provided 
for by the school termination provisions (now 
§ 53A-8-101 et seq.); therefore, where he filed 
his notice of claim within the statutory period 
after termination of the hearing, he complied 
with the relevant requirements. Pratt v. Board 
of Educ, 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977) (decided 
under prior law). 
may or must be served, 45 A.L.R,5th 173. 
Sufficiency of notice of claim against local 
government unit as regards identity, name, 
address, and residence of claimant, 53 
A.L.R.5th 617. 
Sufficiency of notice of claim against local 
political entity as regards time when accident 
occurred, 57 A.L.R.5th 689. 
Waiver of, or estoppel to assert, failure to give 
or defects in notice of claim against state or 
local political subdivision — modern status, 64 
A.L.R.5th 519. 
Amendments to complaint. 
In malpractice action where university phy-
sician was granted immunity upon entry of 
summary judgment, patient's proposed 
amendment to complaint which set forth claims 
against the university that arose out of the 
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in 
the original pleading related back under Utah 
R. Civ. P. 15(c) and was not untimely, even 
though more than a year had passed since the 
original complaint was filed, where no schedul-
ing order had been entered, no trial date had 
been set, no expert discovery had taken place, 
and discovery was still ongoing. Nunez v. Albo, 
2002 UT App 247, 53 P.3d 2, cert, denied, 59 
P.3d 603. 
Cause of action. 
A cause of action against the state accrues at 
the time of the subject accident rather than 
when a plaintiff satisfies the threshold 
requirements under § 31A-22-309. Jepson v. 
State, 846 R2d 485 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Claims barred. 
Neither actual knowledge by county officials 
of circumstances which resulted in death of 
four-year-old child's mother in an automobile 
accident nor minority of the child dispensed 
with necessity of filing timely claim in action 
against county in which it was alleged that 
death was due to inadequate warning signs and 
63-30d-402. Time for filing notice of claim. 
A claim against a governmental entity, or against an employee for an act or 
omission occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the 
scope of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of 
claim is filed with the person and according to the requirements of Section 
63-30d-401 within one year after the claim arises regardless of whether or not 
the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30d-402, enacted by Cross-Referenees. — Health Care Malprac-
L- 2004, ch. 267, § 16, tice Act, § 78-14-1 et seq. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 2004, ch. 267, § 49 Mailing claims to state or political 
makes the act effective on July 1, 2004. subdivisions, § 63-37-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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63-30d-403 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
former section applied to a claim against the 
Department of Transportation arising from the 
sale of property to the Department, which the 
plaintiff claimed was invalid as not properly 
executed, because the action was not a claim on 
a contractual obligation under former § 63-
30-5, which would be exempt from former § 
63-30-12, but was rather a claim to recover 
property under former § 63-30-6. Bullock v. 
State, DOT, 966 P.2d 1215 (Utah Ct. App 
1998). 
Remedy for wrongful act. 
The 1978 amendment to former § 63-30-4 
(now § 63-30d-202) did not leave the parents 
without a remedy for their wrongful birth in-
jury by granting immunity for simple negli-
gence to doctors employed by the state, since 
parents had a remedy against the state for 
injuries arising out of the negligent acts of state 
employees, but the parents failed to give notice 
of their claim to the state within one year. 
Payne ex rel. Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186 
(Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal 
Corporations, Counties, and Other Political 
Subdivisions § 629 et seq; 72 Am. Jur. 2d 
States, Territories, and Dependencies § 77. 
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Counties §§ 239, 240; 64 
C.J S. Municipal Corporations §§ 2173, 2174, 
2199; 78A C.J.S. Schools and School Districts 
§§ 659, 669, 678,681; 81AC.J.S. States §§ 470 
et seq., 490 et seq. 
63-30d-403. Notice of claim — Approval or denial by gov-
ernmental entity or insurance carrier within 60 
days — Remedies for denial of claim. 
(1) (a) Within 60 days of the filing of a notice of claim, the governmental 
entity or its insurance carrier shall inform the claimant in writing that the 
claim has either been approved or denied. 
(b) A claim is considered to be denied if, at the end of the 60-day period, 
the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has failed to approve or 
deny the claim. 
(2) (a) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the 
district court against the governmental entity or an employee of the entity. 
(b) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of 
the claim or within one year after the denial period specified in this 
chapter has expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise 
to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
History: C. 1953, 63-30d-403, enacted by 
L. 2004, ch. 267, § 17. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 2004, ch. 267, § 49 
makes the act effective on July 1, 2004. 





Extension of time for filing suit. 
Waiver for contractual obligations. 
Amended complaint. 
Plaintiffs complied with former section 
where, within a year after the cause of action 
arose, they filed notice of claim with the attor-
ney general and the agency concerned on the 
same day they filed the original complaint with 
the court, and amended complaint alleging 
compliance with the Governmental Immunity 
Act was filed, as a matter of right, within one 
year after denial of the claim or after the end of 
the 90-day period in which the claim is deemed 
to have been denied. Johnson v. Utah State 
Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980). 
Dismissal proper. 
Action for conveyance of excess acreage filed 
one and a half years after filing a notice of claim 
was properly dismissed as being untimely. 
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67-21-2 STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
remedies pursuant to § 10-3-1012 before protect the state and its political subdivisions 
commencing an action under this chapter, from lawsuits arising under the Whistleblower 
Hatton-Ward v. Salt Lake City Corp., 828 P.2d Act. Hall v. Utah State Dep't of Cor., 2001 UT 
1071 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied, 843 34, 24 R3d 958. 
R2d 1042 (Utah 1992). 
In general. 
The Governmental Immunity Act does not 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments employees" within the meaning of state 
in Utah Law — State and Federal Constitu- whistleblower protection acts, 90 A.L.R.5th 
tional Law, 2001 Utah L. Rev. 1070. 687. 
A.L.R. — Pre-emption by workers' compen- Federal pre-emption of whistleblower's state-
sation statute of employee's remedy under state i a w action for wrongful retaliation, 99 A.L.R. 
"whistleblower" statute, 20 A.L.R.5th 677. Fed. 775. 
Who are "public employers" or "public 
67-21-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Adverse action" means to discharge, threaten, or otherwise discrim-
inate against an employee in any manner that affects the employee's 
employment, including compensation, terms, conditions, location, rights, 
immunities, promotions, or privileges. 
(2) "Communicate" means a verbal, written, broadcast, or other com-
municated report. 
(3) "Employee" means a person who performs a service for wages or 
other remuneration under a contract of hire, written or oral, express or 
implied. 
(4) (a) "Employer" means the employing state agency or political sub-
division of the state. 
(b) "Employer" includes an agent of an employer. 
(5) "Public body" means any of the following: 
(a) a state officer, employee, agency, department, division, bureau, 
board, commission, council, authority, educational institution, or any 
other body in the executive branch of state government; 
(b) an agency, board, commission, council, institution member, or 
employee of the legislative branch of state government; 
(c) a county, city, town, regional governing body, council, school 
district, special district, or municipal corporation, board, department, 
commission, council, agency, or any member or employee of them; 
(d) any other body that is created by state or local authority, or that 
is primarily funded by or through state or local authority, or any 
member or employee of that body; 
(e) a law enforcement agency or any member or employee of a law 
enforcement agency; and 
(f) the judiciary and any member or employee of the judiciary. 
History: C. 1953, 67-21-2, enacted by L. Judicial department, Utah Const., Art. VIII. 
1985, ch. 216, § 1; 1989, ch. 189, § 1. Legislative department, Utah Const., Art. VI, 
Cross-References. — Executive depart- State Highway Patrol, Title 53, Chapter 8. 
ment, Utah Const., Art. VII. State institutions, Title 64, 
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PROTECTION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 67-21-3 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Employer. § 63-30-11 was sufficient to establish jurisdio 
Notice of claim against school district and tion over the individual. Youren v. Tintic Sch. 
individual employee of district that was timely Dist., 343 F.3d 1296 (10th Cir. 2003). 
served, listed the individual, and complied with 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments "public employees" within the meaning of state 
in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments — whistleblower protection acts, 90 A.L.R.5th 
Government Affairs, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 254. 687. 
A.L.R. — Who are "public employers" or 
67-21-3. Reporting of governmental waste or violations of 
law — Employer action — Exceptions. 
(1) (a) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee 
because the employee, or a person authorized to act on behalf of the 
employee, communicates in good faith the existence of any waste of public 
funds, property, or manpower, or a violation or suspected violation of a law, 
rule, or regulation adopted under the law of this state, a political 
subdivision of this state, or any recognized entity of the United States. 
(b) For purposes of Subsection (a), an employee is presumed to have 
communicated in good faith if he gives written notice or otherwise 
formally communicates the waste, violation, or reasonable suspicion to the 
state auditor. This presumption may be rebutted by showing that the 
employee knew or reasonably ought to have known that the report is 
malicious, false, or frivolous. 
(2) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee because 
an employee participates or gives information in an investigation, hearing, 
court proceeding, legislative or other inquiry, or other form of administrative 
review held by the public body, 
(3) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee because 
the employee has objected to or refused to carry out a directive that the 
employee reasonably believes violates a law of this state, a political subdivision 
of this state, or the United States, or a rule or regulation adopted under the 
authority of the laws of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the 
United States. 
(4) An employer may not implement rules or policies that unreasonably 
restrict an employee's ability to document the existence of any waste of public 
funds, property, or manpower, or a violation or suspected violation of any laws, 
rules, or regulations. 
History: C. 1953, 67-21-3, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Libel, Title 45, Chap-
1985, ch. 216, § 1; 1989, ch. 189, § 2; 1992, ter 2; § 76-9-501 et seq. 
ch. 187, § 1. 
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67-21-4 STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Activities not protected. 
Restrictions on waste reporting. 
Cited. 
Activities not protected. 
Discipline for failure to abide by reasonable 
established procedures, or for rudeness or inci-
vility, even when it occurs in connection with 
"whistleblowing," does not violate this chapter. 
Baird v. Cutler, 883 F. Supp. 591 (D. Utah 
1995). 
Restrictions on waste reporting. 
While this chapter prohibits employers from 
implementing "rules or policies that unreason-
ably restrict an employee's ability to document 
the existence of waste," it does not prohibit an 
employer from creating any rules or policies 
regarding waste reporting. Baird v Cutler, 883 
F. Supp. 591 (D. Utah 1995). 
Cited in Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 
(Utah 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments — 
Government Affairs, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 254. 
67-21-4. Remedies for employee bringing action — Proof 
required. 
(1) As used in this section, "damages" means damages for injury or loss 
caused by each violation of this chapter. 
(2) An employee who alleges a violation of this chapter may bring a civil 
action for appropriate injunctive relief or actual damages, or both, within 180 
days after the occurrence of the alleged violation of this chapter. 
(3) An action begun under this section may be brought in the district court 
for the county where the alleged violation occurred, the county where the 
complainant resides, or the county where the person against whom the civil 
complaint is filed resides or has his principal place of business. 
(4) To prevail in an action brought under the authority of this section, the 
employee shall establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
employee has suffered an adverse action because the employee, or a person 
acting on his behalf engaged or intended to engage in an activity protected 
under Section 67-21-3. 
History; C. 1953, 67-21-4, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 216, § 1; 1989, ch. 189, § 3; 1996, 
ch. 198, § 39; 1999, ch. 177, § 1. 
Cross-References. — Grounds for injunc-
tion, Rule 65A, U.R.C.R 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Waiver of limitations period. 
The statute of limitations in Subsection (2) of 
this section is phrased permissively, indicating 
that the existence of the public employee's right 
not to suffer adverse action for reporting legal 
violations is not predicated on the filing of suit 
within the limitations period, but simply that 
the right may not be vindicated if suit is not 
timely filed, and thus, for purposes of Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 8(c), the statute of limitations defense is 
a classic affirmative defense which is waivable 
and not a "condition precedent" to the suit. 
Youren v. Tintic Sch. Dist., 343 F.3d 1296 (10th 
Cir. 2003). 
Affirmative defense of failure to comply with 
limitations period in Subsection (2) was waived 
by defendants' failure to include it in the dis-
trict court's pretrial order, Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e). 
Youren v. Tintic Sch. Dist., 343 F.3d 1296 (10th 
Cir. 2003). 
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78-2a-2 JUDICIAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — The Utah Court of Appeals, 
1988 Utah L. Rev. 150. 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — Filing 
fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term of appointment 
to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is until the first general election held 
more than three years after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, 
the term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and commences 
on the first Monday in January, next following the date of election. A judge 
whose term expires may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until a 
successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of 
Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction 
thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three 
judges. Assignment to panels shall be by random rotation of all judges of the 
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection 
of a chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from 
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The term of 
office of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A 
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than 
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting 
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge by 
majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of 
a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial 
Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme 
Court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Stare decisis. panels of that court and all courts of lower 
A rule of law pronounced by a panel of the rank. Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 
Court of Appeals governs all later cases involv- P.2d 677 (Utah 1995). 
ing the same legal issues decided by other 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction* 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
to issue all writs and process necessary: 
14 
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COURT OF APPEALS 78-2a-3 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public 
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases 
involving a first degree or capital felony; 
.(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. ment by ch 255, effective April 30, 2001, added 
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, "parent-time" in Subsection (2)(h) 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. The 2001 amendment by ch 302, effective 
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3; April 30, 2001, inserted "or charge" in Subsec-
1991, ch. 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12; 1994, tion (2)(e) and made stylistic changes 
ch. 13, § 45; 1995, ch. 299, § 47; 1996, ch. This section has been reconciled by the Office 
159, § 19; 1996, ch. 198, § 49; 2001, ch. 255, of Legislative Research and General Counsel. 
§ 20; 2001, ch. 302, § 2. Cross-References. — Composition and ju-
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amend- risdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15,39-6-16 
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23 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 7 
Time to prepare. 
Plaintiff was not prejudiced by two-day no-
tice of hearing to release property subject to 
writ of attachment where he had adequate time 
to prepare for hearing and defendant was re-
quired to post cashier's check in lieu of security. 




Neither plaintiff's failure to serve motion for 
continuance five days before date set for hear-
ing nor failure to file affidavits accompanying 
motion justified denial of motion where plain-
tiff's counsel did not learn of reason for plain-
tiff's inability to appear at hearing m time to 
make motion five days before hearing and Rule 
40(b) does not expressly require affidavits to 
accompany motion for continuance. Bairas v. 
Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 R2d 375 (1962). 
Cited in Goddard v. Bundy, 121 Utah 299, 
241 P.2d 462 (1952); Mower v. Bohmke, 9 Utah 
2d 52, 337 P.2d 429 (1959); Western States 
Thrift & Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 
504 P.2d 1019 (1972); Connelly v. Rathjen, 547 
P.2d 1336 (Utah 1976); Genuine Parts Co. v. 
Larson, 555 P2d 285 (Utah 1976); McEwen 
Irrigation Co. v. Michaud, 558 P.2d 606 (Utah 
1976); Utah Chiropractic Ass'n v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Soc'y, 579 P.2d 1327 (Utah 1978); 
Reagan Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. Utah DOT, 589 
P.2d 782 (Utah 1979); Albrecht v. Uranium 
Servs., Inc., 596 R2d 1025 (Utah 1979); Ute-Cal 
Land Dev. v. Intermountain Stock Exch., 628 
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1981); Bennion v. Hansen, 699 
R2d 757 (Utah 1985); K.O. v. Denison, 748 P.2d 
588 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); P & B Land, Inc. v. 
Klungervik, 751 P.2d 274 (Utah Ct App. 1988); 
Huston v, Lewis, 818 P.2d 531 (Utah 1991); 
Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367 
(Utah 1996); Low v. City of Monticello, 2002 UT 
90, 54 P.3d 1153. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 20 et 
seq.; 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, Rules, and Orders 
§ 10; 62B Am. Jur. 2d Process §§ 114-117, 
227-229. ° 
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § 8; 
66 C. J.S. Notice § 27 et seq.; 71 C.J.S. Pleading 
§§ 98, 114, 219; 72 C.J.S. Process §§ 72, 78. 
A.L.R.—Vacating judgment or granting new 
trial in civil case, consent as ground of after 
expiration of term or time prescribed by statute 
or rules of court, 3 AJL.R.3d 1191. 
Attorney's inaction as excuse for failure to 
timely prosecute action, 15 A.L.R.3d 674. 
Validity of service of summons or complaint 
on Sunday or hohday, 63 A.L.R.3d 423.
 f 
Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Consequences of prosecution's failure to file 
timely brief in appeal by accused, 27 AX.R.4th 
213. 
What constitutes bringing an action to trial 
or other activity in case sufficient to avoid 
dismissal under state statute or court rule 
requiring such activity within stated time, 32 
A.L.R.4th 840. 
PART IIL PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS 
Rule 7. Pleadings, allowed; motions, memoranda, hear-
ings, orders, objection to commissioner's order. 
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a 
counterclaim; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim; 
a third-party complaint, if a person who was not an original party is summoned 
under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party answer,; if a third-party 
complaint is served* Nor other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court 
may order a reply to an answer or a third-party answer. 
(b) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion 
which, unless made during a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court 
commissioner, shall be made in accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in 
writing and state succinctly and with particularity the relief sought and the 
grounds for the relief sought. 
(6) Memoranda. 
(c)(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except 
uncontested or ex parte motions, shall be accompanied by a supporting 
memorandum. Within ten days after service of the motion and supporting 
memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in 
opposition. Within five days after service of the memorandum in opposition, 
the moving party may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to 
Rule 7 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 24 
rebuttal of matters raised in the memorandum in opposition. No other 
memoranda will be considered without leave of court. A party may attach a 
proposed order to its initial memorandum. / 
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument 
without leave of the court. Reply memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of 
argument without leave of the court. 
The court may permit a party to file an over-length memorandum upon ex 
parte application and a showing of good cause. 
(c)(3) Content. 
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall 
contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no 
genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and 
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery 
materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the 
responding party. 
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall 
contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is 
controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts'in 
dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing 
ps^rty shall provide a,n explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by 
citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For 
any additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be 
separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to supporting 
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. 
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain 
a table of contents and a table of authorities with page references. 
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions 
of documents cited in the memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery 
materials. 
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party 
may file a "Request to Submit for Decision." The request to submit for decision 
shall state the date on which the motion was served, the date the opposing 
memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was 
served, and whether a hearing has been requested. If no party files a request, 
the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may 
request a hearing in the motion, in a memorandum or in the request to submit 
for decision. A request for hearing shall be separately identified in the caption 
of the document containing the request. The court shall grant a request for a 
hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of the action 
or any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds that the motion or 
opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively 
decided. 
(f) Orders. 
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute 
order entered in writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the payment 
of money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except 
as otherwise provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the 
adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge who made it with or 
without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered upon trial, 
stipulation, motion or the court's initiative. 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an 
initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing 
party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other 
parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to 
the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party 
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preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an 
objection or upon expiration of the time to object. 
(g) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. A recommendation of 
a court commissioner is the order of the court until modified by the court. A 
party may object to the recommendation by filing an objection in the same 
manner as filing a motion within ten days after the recommendation is made 
in open court or, if the court commissioner takes the matter under advisement, 
ten days after the minute entry of the recommendation is served. A party may 
respond to the objection in the same manner as responding to a motion. 
(Amended effective November 1, 2003; April 1, 2004.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The practice 
for courtesy copies varies by judge and so is not 
regulated by rule. Each party should ascertain 
whether the judge wants a courtesy copy of that 
party's motion, memoranda and supporting 
documents and, if so, when and where to de-
liver them. 
Paragraph (f) applies to all orders, not just 
orders upon motion. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2003 amend-
ment deleted "denominated as such" after 
"counterclaim" in Subdivision (a); rewrote Sub-
divisions (b) and (c); and added Subdivisions (d) 
to(g). 
The 2004 amendment inserted "or in pro-
ceedings before a court commissioner" in Sub-
division (b); substituted the first paragraph in 
Subdivision (c)(2) for a list of maximum lengths 
for different types of memoranda; in Subdivi-
sion (f)(2), substituted "serve upon the other 
parties" for "file" in the first sentence and added 
the last sentence; in Subdivision (g), substi-
tuted "recommendation" for "recommended or-
der" several times and substituted "made in 
open court" for "entered" and added the clause 
beginning "or, if" in the second sentence; and 
added the second paragraph of the Advisory 
Committee Note. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 7, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. —Amendment of plead-
ings to conform to evidence, motion for, 
U.R.C.P. 15(b). 
Commencement of action, U.R.C.P. 3. 
Consolidation of defenses made by motion, 
U.R.C.P. 12(g). 
Counterclaim and cross-claim, U.R.C.R 13. 
Defenses and objections, U.R.C.P. 12. 
Denial of motion, pleading after, U.R.C.R 
12(i). 
Directed verdict and judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict, motion for, U.R.C.P. 50. 
Dismissal of actions, U.R.C.P. 41. 
Eminent domain proceedings, contents of 
complaint in, § 78-34-6. 
Evidence in support of motion, U.R.C.P. 
43(b). 
Execution and proceedings supplemental 
thereto, U.R.C.P. 69. 
Extraordinary relief, U.R.C.P. 65B. 
Forcible entry or detainer, proof required, 
§ 78-36-9. 
Form of pleadings, U.R.C.P. 10. 
"Judgment" defined, U.R.C.P. 54(a). 
One form of action, U.R.C.P. 2. 
Partition of property, complaint to set forth 
interests of all parties, § 78-39-2. 
Pleading special matters, U.R.C.P. 9. 
Relief from judgment or order, U.R.C.P. 60. 
Requirements of signature, U.R.C.P. 11. 
Service and filing of motions, pleadings and 
other papers, U.R.C.P. 5. 
Special forms of writs abolished, U.R.C.P. 
65B(a). 
Supreme Court, rulemaking power of, § 78-
2-4. 
Temporary restraining orders, setting aside, 
U.R.C.P. 65A. 
Time for service of written motions, U.R.C.P. 
6(d). 




Prayer for relief. 
—New trial. 
Particularization. 







Investors who lost money in a failed invest-
ment venture and whose multi-count complaint 
stemming from their losses was dismissed were 
properly denied the opportunity to amend their 
complaint because they never filed an actual 
motion, but merely cited Rule 15 without artic-
ulating any reasons why leave to amend their 
136-page, 725-paragraph complaint was mer-
ited. Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, 485 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 79 R3d 974. 
Prayer for relief. 
Although a trial court may cleny a motion to 
amend the complaint for a movant's failure to 
present a written motion and a proposed 
amended complaint, that rule does not apply to 
the prayer for relief because, under Rule 54(c), 
the prayer does not limit the relief which the 
court may grant. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills 
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were properly set aside where trial court failed Time for appeal. 
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal 
summons was not timely issued. Fibreboard from a default judgment in a city court ran from 
Paper Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, the date of notice of entry of such judgment, 
475'R2d 1005 (1970). rather than from the date of judgment. Buck-
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action,
 ner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 124, 
promptly objected to date set for trial on the 288 R2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank & 
ground that their counsel had an already Trust Co v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d). 
scheduled appearance in another court on that 
date, but due to fact that there were no law or Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 
motion days between time objection was filed Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re- J.RW. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 R2d 486 (Utah 
fusal to set aside default judgment entered 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986); 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, 11 R3d 277. 
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. 
Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason- hearing as to determination of amount of dam-
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for In ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham Opening default or default judgment claimed 
v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937. to have been obtained because of attorney's 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § mistake as to time or place of appearance, trial, 
265 et seq. or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 1255. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218, Failure to give notice of application for de-
AX.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to fault judgment where notice is required only by 
liability against defaulting defendant, 8 custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
A.l.R.3d 1070. Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus- pretrial conference, 55 A L.R.3d 303. 
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d Default judgments against the United States 
1272. under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed 190. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part 
thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action 
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
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(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supple-
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
garty opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the 
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount 
of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to 
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party" or attorney 
may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Affidavit. Disputed facts. 
—Contents. Effect of denial. 
—Corporation Evidence 
—Experts —Admissions of plaintiff. 
—Extension of time to submit. —Facts considered. 
—Failure to submit. —Improper evidence. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. —Proof. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. —Unsupported motion. 
Resting on pleadings. —Weight of testimony. 
—Objection. Implicit rulings. 
—Sufficiency. Improper party plaintiff. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony. Issue of fact. 
—Superseding pleadings. —Contract interpretation. 
—Unpleaded defenses. —Corporate existence. 
—Verified pleading. —Deeds. 
—Waiver of right to contest. —Intent to remove trustee. 
—When unavailable. —Lease as security. 
Exclusive control of facts. —Notice. 
—Who may make. —Wills. 
Affirmative defense. Judicial attitude. 
Answers to interrogatories. Motion for new trial. 
Appeal Motion to dismiss. 
—Adversely affected party. Motion to reconsider. 
—Standard of review. Notice. ^ 
Applicability. —Provision not jurisdictional. 
Attorney's fees. —Waiver of defect. 
Availability of motion. Procedural due process. 
Compliance with rule. Purpose. 
Cross-motions. Scope. 
Damages. Summary judgment improper. 
Discovery. —Damage to insured vehicle. 
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Credit Union v. Jenkins, 528 P.2d 1187 (Utah 
1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of 
§ 1004 et seq. judgment against one joint tort-feasor as re-
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584. lease of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted 
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the 
following causes; provided, how.ever, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or 
any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on 
any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by 
chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit 
of any one of the jurors. 
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against. 
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the appli-
cation, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and 
produced at the trial. 
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion oxjfrejudice. 
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or 
that it is against law. 
(a)(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 
10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made 
under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. 
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served 
with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within 
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or 
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period 
not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties 
by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the 
court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Juror's competency as witness as to validity 
Rule 59, F.R.C.P. of verdict or indictment,. Rules of Evidence, 
Cross-References. — Harmless error not Rule 606. 
ground for new trial, Rule 61. 
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(3) Subject to limitations imposed by law, any trial court of record may hold 
court in any location designated by this rule 
(Added effective January 1, 1992, amended effective November 15, 1995, 
November 1, 2001, April 1, 2003.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amend- The 2003 amendment deleted "Murray" and 
ment deleted "Park City" from the list of loca- "Roy" from the list of municipalities m Subdi 
tions of trial courts and added new Subdivision vision (1) 
(2), redesignating former Subdivision (2) as (3) 
Rule 4-408.01. Responsibility for administration of trial 
courts. 
Intent: 
To designate the court locations administered directly through the admin-
istrative office of the courts and those-administered through contract with local 
government pursuant to § 78-3-21. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the trial courts of record and to the administrative 
office of the courts 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) All locations of the juvenile court shall be administered directly through 
the administrative office of the courts 
(2) All locations of the district court shall be administered directly through 
the administrative office of the courts, except the following, which shall be 
administered through contract w ith county or municipal government pursuant 
to § 78-3-21 Fillmore, Junction, Kanab, Loa, Manila, Manti, Morgan, 
Panguitch, Randolph, and Salem. 
(Added effective November 15, 1995, amended effective January 27, 1997; 
November 1, 1998; November 1, 2001) 
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amend-
ment deleted "Coalville" and "Park City" from 
the list in Subdivision (2) 
ARTICLE 5. CIVIL PRACTICE 
Rule 4-501. Motions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for fil supporting memoranda 
and documents with the court 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on 
dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all trial courts of record except 
proceedings before the court commissioners and small claims cases. This rule 
does not apply to petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary 
relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda 
(1)(A) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested 
or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of points and 
authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number to 
relevant portions of deposfoions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in 
support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or opposing a motion shall not 
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the "statement of material facts" as 
provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the court on ex-parte 
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application. If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memoran-
dum, the application shall state the length of the principal memorandum, and 
if the memorandum is in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a 
summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five pages. 
(1)(B) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party shall file 
and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a motion, a 
memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting documentation. 
If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in opposition to the motion 
within ten days after service of the motion, the moving party may notify the 
clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision as provided in paragraph 
(1)(D) of this rule. 
(1)(C) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply 
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's memo-
randum. 
(1)(D) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day 
period to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the clerk to submit 
the matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in the form of a 
separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." The 
Notice to Submit for Decision shall state the date on which the motion was 
served, the date the memorandum in opposition, if any, was served, the date 
the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been 
requested. The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. 
If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(2)(A) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in 
support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that 
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which movant contends no 
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered sentences 
and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the 
movant relies. 
(2)(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that 
contains a verbatim restatement of each of the movant's statement of facts as 
to which the party contends a genuine issue exists followed by a concise 
statement of material facts which support the party's contention. Each 
disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall 
specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party 
relies. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly 
supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for 
the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the 
opposing party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(3)(A) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless 
ordered by the court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs 
(3)(B)or(4)Wow. 
(3)(B) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action or 
any claim in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at the time 
of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition to a motion 
may file a written request for a hearing. 
(3)(C) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the 
motion or opposition to the amotion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue 
or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has been 
authoritatively decided. 
(3)(D) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the 
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall set the 
matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter shall be 
h^ard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for hearing and 
notify all parties of the date and time. 
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(3)(E) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the 
motion, memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting 
or opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the matter at 
least two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies shall be clearly 
marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time of the hearing. 
Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the court. 
(3)(F) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties file 
their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived. 
(3)(G) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before 
the scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after that date 
without leave of the court. 
(3)(H) If a hearing has been requested and the non-moving party fails to file 
a memorandum in opposition, the moving party may withdraw the request or 
the court on its own motion may strike the request and decide the motion 
without oral argument. 
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause 
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case 
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule 
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal 
issues and could be resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's request 
may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without court 
appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments and 
the rulings thereon if requested by counsel. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991; November 1, 1996; 
November 1, 1998; April 1, 1999; April 1, 2001; November 1, 2001.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend- substituted the language beginning "contains a 
ment substituted "claim" for "issues" in Subdi- verbatim restatement" for "a concise statement 
vision (3)(B). of material facts as to which the party contends 
The April 2001 amendment added the second a genuine issue exists" and deleted "and, if 
sentence to Subdivision (1)(D) and made stylis- applicable, shall state the numbered sentence 
tic changes in the subdivision designations. or sentences of the movant's facts that are 
The November 2001 amendment, in Subdivi- disputed" at the end of the second sentence, 
sion (2)(B), at the end of the first sentence 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Decisions sua sponte. 
Purpose. 
Request for hearing. 
Supplemental memoranda. 
When rule applies. 
Cited. 
Decisions sua sponte. 
While a court may refrain from addressing a 
matter that is not submitted for decision under 
this rule, nothing in this rule or any other rule 
bars a court from deciding such a matter sua 
sponte. Scott v. Majors, 1999 UT App 139, 980 
P.2d 214, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 
1999). 
No notice to submit for decision under this 
rule is required, and a trial therefore correctly 
determined that it could rule on pending mo-
tions sua sponte. Scott v. Majors, 1999 UT App 
139, 980 P.2d 214, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 
(Utah 1999). 
Purpose. 
The purpose of the code of judicial adminis-
tration is not to create or modify substantive 
rights of litigants, but to bring order to the 
manner in which the courts operate. Scott v. 
Majors, 1999 UT App 139, 980 P.2d 214, cert, 
denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999). 
Request for hearing. 
Once a request for hearing by one of the 
parties has been granted and the matter set for 
hearing, the other party has a right to rely upon 
such setting regardless of whether it made its 
own request. Price v. Armour, 949 P. 2d 1251 
(Utah 1997). 
Supplemental memoranda. 
The plural "memoranda" in Subdivision (l)(a) 
refers to all memoranda received by the court 
— from all parties that either oppose or support 
any motion — and does not mean that each 
party may submit more than one memoran-
dum; thus, the trial court was well within its 
discretion in refusing to accept a supplemental 
memorandum that was submitted without 
prior invitation and' outside the bounds of pro-
cedural rules. Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 
888 P.2d 694 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
When rule applies. 
Because the defendants' Rule 56(e) objection 
to the plaintiff's first affidavit was framed as a 
b..1A. 
